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Abstract
To gain insights about the quality of board’s firing decisions, we investigate abnormal
stock returns and operating performance around CEO-turnover announcements in a new hand-
collected sample of 208 “clean” turnover events between January 1998 and June 2009. Unlike
the majority of previous studies, we show that forced turnovers do not per se represent a
positive signal to shareholders. On the contrary, investors seem to critically assess the board’s
firing decision by considering the quality of the departing manager. When an outperforming
CEO is dismissed or forced to leave - an event that occurs in as many as 35% of all dismissals
in our sample - shareholders disesteem the board’s decision. This finding is confirmed in
multivariate cross-sectional regressions, holds for different time subperiods, and is robust to
various event-test specifications and proxies of CEO quality.
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Are Forced CEO Turnovers Good or Bad News?
Abstract
To gain insights about the quality of board’s firing decisions, we investigate abnormal
stock returns and operating performance around CEO-turnover announcements in a new hand-
collected sample of 208 “clean” turnover events between January 1998 and June 2009. Unlike
the majority of previous studies, we show that forced turnovers do not per se represent a
positive signal to shareholders. On the contrary, investors seem to critically assess the board’s
firing decision by considering the quality of the departing manager. When an outperforming
CEO is dismissed or forced to leave - an event that occurs in as many as 35% of all dismissals
in our sample - shareholders disesteem the board’s decision. This finding is confirmed in
multivariate cross-sectional regressions, holds for different time subperiods, and is robust to
various event-test specifications and proxies of CEO quality.
1 Introduction
The duty of a Chief Executive Officer is to maximize shareholders’ wealth by taking sensible
management decisions. Given the scope and importance of this mission, it is evident that a CEO
turnover represents a major event in the history of a corporation, with possibly far reaching conse-
quences for the company and its shareholders. Along these lines, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) show
that the individual management style of a CEO directly affects the investment and financial policy
as well as the organizational strategy and the performance of a company.
The aim of this paper is to assess the impact of (forced) CEO turnovers on shareholder value.
Much academic work on company boards is dedicated to the question whether they act as “watch-
dogs” or “lapdogs”. We take a different stance on this debate by asking whether boards acting as
watchdogs (i.e. by firing CEOs) do so in a sensible manner: Are they good or bad “watchdogs”?
More precisely, by investigating the cross-sectional variation of abnormal stock returns around
(forced) CEO turnovers, we study whether boards of directors act in the shareholders’ interest.
A real-world example will best illustrate the economic story of this paper. The example refers
to Mr. Fred Kindle, former CEO of ABB Ltd, a global leader in power and automation technolo-
gies. Under his leadership, ABB recovered from financial distress and achieved a record result in
2007. ABB’s stock price rose from around 6 Swiss francs in January 2005, the time of Kindle’s
appointment as CEO, to around 25 Swiss francs in February 2008. According to the Financial
Times, ABB’s recovery qualifies as “case study of successful company restructuring”.1 Neverthe-
less, on February 13, 2008, ABB surprisingly announced in an official statement that Fred Kindle
1http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5a5db304-da69-11dc-9bb9-0000779fd2ac.html
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would leave ABB “due to irreconcilable differences about how to lead the company”.2 The CFO
of ABB, Michel Demaré, was appointed ad interim CEO, but at that time was also considered as
a potential candidate for the position of permanent CEO. Several news agencies3 speculated that
this decision was mainly caused by a power struggle with the president of the board, Hubertus
von Gruenberg, regarding ABB’s acquisition strategy. The departure of Fred Kindle was a big
surprise to the financial community as everybody agreed that he was doing an outstanding job at
ABB. Strikingly, the Financial Times referred to him as the “wunderkind chief executive”. The
fact that investors shared the same positive perception about Fred Kindle’s performance is crucially
captured by the stock-price reaction on the announcement date of his departure. In spite of the
simultaneous announcements of (i) a record result for the year 2007, (ii) a doubling of the dividend
(18% in excess of the mean analyst dividend forecast)4, and (iii) upcoming share repurchases, the
stock price dropped sharply by 5.14% on that very same day. According to Bloomberg, ABB’s
stock price lost interim about 10%, which was the worst drop of the previous three years. While the
academic literature has repeatedly stressed the beneficial effects of forced turnovers (e.g. Furtado
and Rozeff, 1987; Denis and Denis, 1995; Kang and Shivdasani, 1996; Huson, Parrino, and Starks,
2001; Dherment-Ferere and Renneboog, 2002; Adams and Mansi, 2009), the example of Mr. Kindle
suggests that the impact of a firing decision on shareholders’ wealth might be negative and that the
quality of the departing manager is a crucial variable in assessing the board’s decision.5
A large part of prior research on CEO turnovers focuses on the relation between the CEO’s per-
formance and the turnover probability (e.g. Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; Weisbach, 1988; Warner,
Watts, and Wruck, 1988; Parrino, 1997; Suchard, Singh, and Barr, 2001; Defond and Hung, 2003;
Jenter and Kanaan, 2010, among others). This strand of literature comes to the conclusion that
there is a negative relation between the company’s performance and the probability of a (forced)
turnover. However, while statistically significant, this negative relation is generally considered to
be economically weak (Brickley, 2003).
A second strand of literature which is of immediate relevance for the hypotheses studied in this
paper investigates the impact of CEO turnovers on the company’s performance. Contributions typ-
ically focus either on accounting-based or stock-price-based performance measures. Table 1 presents
an overview of the most important papers that study the impact of CEO turnovers on shareholder
value together with a summary of the main empirical findings. They differ with respect to the
characteristics of the turnovers considered: (i) outside vs. inside successions (cf. Table 1, columns
7-8), (ii) forced vs. voluntary turnovers6 (cf. Table 1, columns 9-10), (iii) governance differences
2ABB Press Release: “ABB CEO Fred Kindle leaves company”, available at http://www.abb.com.
3Amongst others Reuters, Bloomberg, Timesonline, Financial Times, Financial Times Deutschland, Handelsblatt
and Handelszeitung covered the news regarding the departure of Fred Kindle at ABB.
4The mean analyst dividend forecast is obtained from I/B/E/S, Thomson Reuters.
5Despite the fact that the story of Mr. Kindle motivates very well this study and is a prime example of a CEO
turnover that achieved broad media attention and had a shocking impact on investors, we should remark that this
event is not included in the empirical analysis due to a “no-confounding-event” criterion applied in the construction
of the sample. More precisely, the release of other valuation-relevant news (dividends and earnings announcements)
on the date of the announcement of the dismissal of Mr. Kindle prevents us from using this event.
6A special category of management turnovers is represented by sudden deaths. The stock-price reactions in the
aftermath of such key-executives’ deaths is studied by Johnson, Magee, Nagarajan, and Newman (1985) and Worrell,
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(see Fisman, Khurana, and Rhodes-Kropf, 2005), and (iv) gender differences (see Lee and James,
2007; Coxbill, Sanning, and Shaffer, 2009).
[Table 1 about here]
The majority of studies that scrutinize the subsample of forced turnovers find that abnormal
returns following firings are higher than those following voluntary turnovers (e.g. Furtado and Roz-
eff, 1987; Denis and Denis, 1995; Kang and Shivdasani, 1996; Huson, Parrino, and Starks, 2001;
Dherment-Ferere and Renneboog, 2002; Adams and Mansi, 2009, among others). Borokhovich, Par-
rino, and Trapani (1996) report a significant positive abnormal performance after forced turnovers
with an outside successor. Only Dedman and Lin (2002) detect significantly negative abnormal
returns on average after CEO dismissals.
This paper challenges the widespread notion that firing decisions by board of directors represent
positive news to investors. In particular, we argue that an important share of CEO firings are
not in the interest of shareholders. While forced turnovers of skilled managers (as proxied by
the prior relative company performance under his/her leadership) trigger positive and statistically
significant abnormal returns (+5.73% in a [-3 0]-day event window), forced turnovers of high-quality
CEOs (35% of all forced turnovers in our sample) are associated with negative abnormal returns
(−2.24% in a [-3 0]-day event window). Thus, shareholders seem to assess the quality of boards’
firing decisions by considering the quality and skills of the departing CEO. If the prior relative
stock performance under the departing CEO is positive, shareholders disfavor the board’s decision
and adjust downward their estimates about the value of the company. By studying the impact
of information asymmetries (as proxied by analyst coverage) on abnormal returns, we rule out
the hypothesis proposed by Ertugrul and Krishnan (2011) that the negative abnormal returns
after dismissals of well-performing CEOs are due to the release of (supposedly superior) private
information by the board of directors about the low quality of the outgoing CEO. Further, the
opposite impact of CEO firings in dependence of the CEO quality is economically meaningful
and statistically robust even after accounting for a variety of control variables, such as CEO age,
company size, and governance changes directly related to the CEO turnover. It holds for (i) different
event windows, (ii) time subperiods, (iii) alternative proxies of CEO quality, and (iv) a wide range
of parametric and non-parametric test specifications. Finally, the relevance of prior performance in
assessing the quality of the board’s decision is also reflected in the subsequent long-term evolution
of operating return on assets.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the hypotheses tested in
this paper. Section 3 describes the data and the sample construction. In Section 4 we conduct the
empirical analysis: After addressing the setup of the event-study (Subsection 4.1) and presenting
general results related to the impact of CEO turnovers on abnormal stock returns (Subsection 4.2),
we regress abnormal returns against various CEO-turnover variables (Subsection 4.3) and conduct
extensive robustness checks (Subsection 4.4). Section 5 extends the analysis to the companies’
operating performance. Finally, Section 6 provides a summary of the paper and concludes.
Davidson, Chandy, and Garrison (1986).
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2 CEO Quality and Forced Turnovers
The board of directors has the non-transferable and indefeasible duty of nomination and dis-
missal of the management of a company. The majority of empirical studies (cf. Table 1, column
9) report positive stock-price reactions around the announcements of CEO dismissals (or at least
larger than those triggered by voluntary CEO departures):
• Furtado and Rozeff (1987): “...when dismissals occur, it is apparent that the benefits to the
stockholder are quite great”.
• Kang and Shivdasani (1996): “...returns are greater when turnover is forced than when
turnover represents normal succession”.
• Dherment-Ferere and Renneboog (2002): “...announcement of a forced CEO resignation is
hailed favorably by the market”.
• Adams and Mansi (2009): “...CEO turnover events are associated with increased stock returns,
with forced and outside turnover events having the largest increases”.
Scholars usually mention two theories to explain the positive stock-price reactions after CEO dis-
missals: (i) the improved management theory and (ii) the scapegoat theory. Both assume information
asymmetry between the board of directors and managers.
According to the improved management theory of Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino (2004), boards
assess the quality of CEOs by observing their performance. A CEO will be replaced if the real-
ized performance is sufficiently low and the expected benefit of a turnover exceeds expected costs.
According to this argument, investors should interpret a firing decision by the board as a positive
signal about the quality differential separating the new from the incumbent CEO.
Under the scapegoat theory based on Holmström (1979), Shavell (1979), and Mirrlees (1976)
firings of CEOs occur even though all managers are assumed to be identical in terms of quality.
The threat of a dismissal merely serves to ensure adequate effort by the incumbent CEO. In equi-
librium, all CEOs provide the same effort and low performance arises just by chance. In case of
poor performance, the board of directors will fire a CEO just to maintain the threat of dismissal
thereby creating the incentive to supply the optimal level of effort. Since in this model the poor
performance leading to the dismissal of a CEO is simply the result of luck and not poor managerial
quality or lack of effort, the fired CEO can be viewed as a scapegoat. Both theories assume that
boards act in the shareholders’ best and are successful in explaining the empirically established
positive stock-market reaction following CEO dismissals.
In this paper, we challenge the notion that forced turnovers are homogeneous events that per se
signal positive news to shareholders. In particular, we depart from the assumption that boards of
directors act in the shareholders’ best interest and conjecture that CEO firings have to be examined
in tight connection with the quality of the departing CEO. Thus, we expect positive abnormal
returns following a forced turnover of a low-quality manager and negative abnormal returns after a
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forced departure of a high-quality manager. While the former event reflects a good decision by the
company’s board of directors, the latter does not. Hence, the two main hypotheses tested in this
study are as follows.
Hypothesis 1: The announcement of forced turnovers of low-quality CEOs yield positive
abnormal stock returns.
Hypothesis 2: The announcement of forced turnovers of high-quality CEOs yield nega-
tive abnormal stock returns.
3 Data
3.1 Sample Construction
The data comprises CEO turnovers of companies in the Swiss Performance Index (SPI) between
January 1998 and June 2009. The sample is hand-collected and initially consists of 347 turnovers at
184 companies. To construct the sample, we apply the following procedure. First, the complete list
of CEO changes is obtained by collecting annual reports of all the companies included in the SPI
since January 1998. Second, to identify the events and obtain the exact CEO-turnover announce-
ment dates, the following sources are screened: (i) ad-hoc disclosures at the SIX Swiss Exchange,
(ii) articles in leading Swiss financial and business newspapers (in particular, “NZZ”, “Finanz und
Wirtschaft”, and “Handelszeitung”), (iii) company-specific news provided by Bloomberg, (iv) com-
pany Internet sites, and (v) selected Internet news sites.7
We include CEO-turnover events in the final sample if they cumulatively satisfy the following
criteria:
(i) The date of the announcement, i.e. the first day investors can trade on the CEO-turnover infor-
mation, has to be identifiable (this also includes the information on whether the announcement
was made before or after the closing of the market);
(ii) The relevant details regarding the departing and the incoming CEO (age, succession type, and
successor origin) have to be known;
(iii) There must be no confounding events, such as announcements of earnings, dividends, debt
or equity offerings, corporate scandals, etc. in a seven-day time period centered around the
turnover announcement. This criterion ensures that the analysis is conducted on “clean” CEO-
turnover events and that the stock-market reaction is not due to news unrelated to the CEO
change. We also aim at excluding CEO-turnover events that might reveal new information
7Internet sites include www.news.ch, www.swissinfo.ch, and http://moneycab.presscab.com.
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privately held by the board about the quality of the departing CEO. This can be the case
when a CEO firing reveals the existence of accounting fraud, corporate scandals, or serious
negligence.
(iv) CEO turnovers must not be directly related to the takeover of a company;
(v) Finally, to guarantee a reasonably accurate estimation of the market model, we require the
availability of a one-year stock-price history with at least 100 transaction days within this
250-day estimation period.
To get a first impression of the trading activity around CEO-turnover announcement dates,
we consider the stock trading volume (TV ) as measured by the number of traded shares (Datas-
tream item “Turnover by Volume”). Specifically, we compute the following standardized measure
of abnormal trading volume:
STV Ait =
TVit
TV Nit
− 1, (1)
where TVit is the realized trading volume of company i at day t (relative to the announcement
day) and TV Ni is the normal, i.e. the expected, trading volume which is measured – in accordance
with a constant-mean model – as the average trading volume between day −60 and day −11:
TV Ni = 1/50 ·
∑−11
t=−60 TVit. STV
A is easy to interpret because it represents the percentage increase
in trading volume relative to a 50-day benchmark period before the event date.
Figure 1 depicts daily average abnormal trading volumes of all CEO-turnover announcements
and the subsamples of forced and voluntary CEO changes. The graphs show a distinct increase of
the average STV A on the announcement date and the two following days. For the total sample
(Figure 1a) the average trading volume on the event day is +129.97% larger than the average
trading volume in the estimation period. An increase in trading volume by almost +200% can also
be observed in Figure 1b for the subsample of forced departures. Thus, CEO-turnover news triggers
a substantial trading activity among investors.
[Figure 1 about here]
3.2 Explanatory Variables
For all CEO-turnover events, we gather detailed information regarding the company, the de-
parting CEO, the new CEO, and several turnover characteristics. The most important explanatory
variables are the successor origin (inside vs. outside successions), the departure type (forced vs.
voluntary departures)8, and the managerial quality of the departing CEO as proxied by the prior
8In this paper, the terms firing, dismissal, and forced turnover are used interchangeably in spite of slightly different
shades of meaning. In particular, we do not distinguish between straight dismissals and forced resignations because
in both cases the CEO departure is a consequence of the board’s will.
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stock performance relative to a broad stock-market index.9
In the related literature, the successor origin is measured by applying two alternative rules. Ac-
cording to the first rule, the new CEO is classified as an outsider if the appointment as CEO occurs
on the same date as he/she joined the company; All other successors are classified as insiders (see
Denis and Denis, 1995). According to the second rule, the new CEO is considered as an outsider
if he/she has a working history in the relevant company of less than a year (see Parrino, 1997). In
this paper, successors are classified as insiders or outsiders according to the former rule. However,
applying the latter method does not qualitatively alter the major findings. In our sample, 75 CEO
turnovers (36% of the total sample) are classified as outside successions and 133 turnovers (64% of
the total sample) are classified as inside successions. Out of these 133 inside successions 25 are ad
interim.
The division into forced and voluntary departures is also carried out following the methodology
of Denis and Denis (1995). Based on the information provided by diverse media reports, such as
leading Swiss financial and business newspapers, ad-hoc news, and company statements, a CEO
turnover is classified as forced if it is accompanied by an internal conflict with the board. In
those cases in which the turnover cannot be directly assigned either to the forced or the voluntary
turnovers on the basis of the available data, we apply the following decision scheme: If the departing
CEO is not over 64 years old and the newly appointed CEO is an outsider, the turnover is assigned
to the subsample of forced departures. By applying this procedure, the sample of forced turnovers
consists of 60 events (29% of the total sample) and the sample of voluntary turnovers includes 148
events (71%).10
The quality of the departing manager is measured based on the relative stock performance of
the company under his/her leadership. In particular, the relative stock performance is calculated
against the Swiss Performance Index in a 250 trading-day period from day −260 to day −11 pre-
ceding the turnover announcement. Depending on the sign of the prior relative performance, the
event is assigned either to subsample of low- or high-quality CEOs. In our sample, 118 turnovers
(57% of the total sample) are preceded by prior underperformance and 90 turnovers (43%) by prior
overperformance.
Table 2 provides a breakdown of the final sample by year and turnover characteristics. While
there seem to be an overall increase in the total number of CEO turnovers over the years, this
development is far from being steady and smooth.
[Table 2 about here]
It is worth noting that the percentages of outside successions and forced departures are, with
36% and 29% of the sample, respectively, slightly higher than those reported in recent studies. For
9As an alternative measure of CEO quality, we will use in Subsection 4.4 the prior stock performance relative to
industry indexes.
10We actually obtain the same number of forced and voluntary turnovers by classifying turnovers according to the
rule of Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino (2004). These authors classify turnovers for which no explicit firing reason
could be found in the media as forced, if the departing CEO was younger than 60 and did not take a comparable
position in another company.
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instance, Adams and Mansi (2009) report for the period between 1990 and 2000 29.4% of outside
replacements and 19.6% of forced turnovers; Parrino (1997) classifies only 15% of all turnovers in
his sample as outside successions and only 13% as forced departures; Finally, Clayton, Hartzell,
and Rosenberg (2005) examine the impact of CEO changes on the stock-price volatility and classify
20.6% of turnovers as outside successions and 17.4% as forced departures.
For the purpose of this study, it is important to emphasize that out of the 60 forced turnovers
in our sample as many as 21 (or 35%) concern CEOs who deliverd an above-average performance
in the run-up to the dismissal. Interestingly, the large number of CEO dismissals with a positive
prior stock performance is not a peculiarity of the Swiss market. In fact, Ertugrul and Krishnan
(2011) point out that 37% (49%) of CEO dismissals in the US occur in the absence of negative raw
(industry-adjusted) stock returns.
3.3 Control Variables
Abnormal stock returns induced by a turnover announcement might be influenced by a number
of variables besides the origin of the new CEO, the performance of the departing CEO, and the
turnover type. In the following, we consider control variables that are typically used in related
studies (e.g. Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino, 2004, among others).
To account for the existence of effects related to the size of a company, we include as a control
variable the logarithm of companies’ total assets (SIZE) as provided by Datastream.
The age of the incumbent and the newly appointed CEO can also play an important role in
determining the magnitude of the stock-price reaction. For example, if the incumbent CEO is close
to retirement age, his/her departure might be anticipated and thus lack a strong surprise effect.
In this case, the age of the departing CEO will have a dampening effect on the news impact. The
appointment of a young CEO who is relatively unknown and potentially less experienced could also
have a material effect on the stock-price reaction. To control for age-related effects, we include the
logarithm of the age of the departing and incoming CEOs denoted by AGEDEP and AGEINC,
respectively.
The replacement of the incumbent CEO with a new one might directly alter the governance
structure of a company. This is the case when a dual-mandate structure is introduced or ceases
to exist as a consequence of the CEO change. To account for corporate-governance changes that
are directly related to the CEO turnover, we use as controls in cross-sectional regressions two
dummy variables. DUALOLD assumes a value of one if the CEO turnover ends a dual-mandate
structure and zero otherwise. DUALNEW assumes a value of one if the CEO turnover introduces
a dual-mandate structure and zero otherwise. In our sample, we observe 18 corporate governance
improvements (dual mandates that cease to exist) and 11 corporate governance deteriorations (newly
created dual mandates).
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4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Methodology
To measure the impact of CEO-turnover announcements on shareholder value, we apply stan-
dard event-study methodology. As usual, the tests rely on the assumption of market efficiency, i.e.
that stock prices reflect all relevant information and thus quickly incorporate the effect related to
CEO-turnover news. Consequently, we choose short-term event windows to measure the impact
on stock prices. Following Brown and Warner (1985) and McWilliams and Siegel (1997) this event
window should be long enough to capture the impact of the event, but short enough to minimize the
influence of confounding effects unrelated to the CEO-turnover event. By employing different event
windows ranging from one to four days we avoid relying on a specific, and possibly arbitrary, length
of the event window. To account for potential information leakage, we let some event windows start
before the CEO-turnover announcement date.
In accordance with the bulk of the literature on short-term event studies, we calculate abnormal
stock returns in the event window by subtracting from realized stock returns the “normal” returns
obtained by the market model. The parameters of the market model are estimated over a 250
trading-day period ending 11 days before the CEO-turnover announcement date. To make sure
that the findings of the paper are not driven by inaccurately estimated parameters, the estimation
of the market model is performed both by simple OLS and robust linear regressions (Huber, 1973).
More specifically, in each iteration the weights are calculated by applying the bisquare function to
the residuals from the previous iteration. Since the results of the two estimation procedures do
not lead to qualitatively different results, for the sake of brevity, only the OLS regression results
are reported in the paper. In addition to measuring the magnitude of mean and median abnormal
returns, it is critical to determine their statistical significance. For this purpose we employ as base-
line event-study tests the Standardized Cross-Sectional test by Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen
(1991) (henceforth simply denoted as Boehmer test) which specifically accounts for possible vari-
ance changes induced by the turnover event and theWilcoxon Signed Rank test by Wilcoxon (1945)
(henceforth simply denoted as Wilcoxon test) which is a non-parametric test and thus does not rely
on specific distributional assumptions about abnormal stock returns.
4.2 Abnormal Returns Around CEO Turnovers
We start the empirical analysis by measuring abnormal returns (ARs) of four relevant samples:
(i) the total sample of CEO turnovers, (ii) forced turnovers, (iii) forced turnovers of low-quality
CEOs, and (iv) forced turnovers of high-quality CEOs. Table 3 reports both average and median
abnormal returns with the corresponding Boehmer and Wilcoxon test statistics.11
11While standardized residuals from the market model - and not abnormal returns - are used in the calculation
of the test statistics of Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991), in Table 3 we still report mean abnormal returns
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For the majority of the event windows considered, the average and median abnormal returns
related to the whole sample (Panel A) are positive but not statistically significant. The evolution
of cumulative ARs starting from day −3 is depicted in Figure 2a and shows a weak upward trend
that never reaches statistical significance.
According to the improved management theory and prior empirical literature on forced turnovers,
we expect the stock price to rise following decisions to fire a CEO. This prediction finds support
in the results shown in Table 3, Panel B and depicted in the evolution of ARs in Figure 2b. The
mean ARs for the subsample of forced turnovers are positive and significant on the announcement
day and the event windows [-3 0] and [-1 0] with values of +1.70%, +2.87%, and +2.28%, respec-
tively. By comparing in Figure 2b the development of ARs of forced turnovers to ARs of voluntary
turnovers one can visually capture the striking difference in the pattern of the two lines: positive
and increasing for the former and very close to zero for the latter. For all tested event windows,
ARs following voluntary turnovers are found to be insignificant at all conventional confidence levels
(results not reported).
Panel C and D of Table 3 describe the impact of forced turnover of low- and high-quality CEOs.
It stands out that – in accordance with hypothesis 1 of this paper – mean and median ARs follow-
ing dismissals of low-quality CEOs are positive and significant for all event periods (except for the
median AR on day −1). Conversely, the dismissal of high-quality CEOs is associated with negative
stock-price reactions, which supports hypothesis 2 of this paper. The diverse reaction of investors
to CEO dismissals in dependence of the prior stock performance is depicted in Figure 2c.
[Table 3 about here]
[Figure 2 about here]
To identify types of CEO turnovers that convey value-relevant news to shareholders, we an-
alyze specific subsamples of CEO turnovers. Table 4, Panel A ranks the subsamples defined by
one turnover characteristic according to the magnitude of the corresponding [-3 0]-ARs. Forced
turnovers (FOR), the departure of low-quality CEOs (LQY), and outside successions (OUT) gen-
erate the largest and most significant ARs with respective values of +2.87%, +2.07%, and +1.76%.
Departures of high-quality managers (HQY) trigger negative and statistically significant abnormal
returns (mean [-3 0]-AR of −1.30%, t-value = -1.80).
To learn more about the information content of different types of CEO turnovers we extend
the current analysis by defining further subsamples through the combination of different turnover
characteristics. In a first step we calculate in Table 4, Panel B [-3 0]-ARs for all 12
((
3
2
)
· (2 · 2)
)
possible subsamples that can be constructed by pairwise interrelating the three selection criteria
(turnover type, successor origin, and CEO quality). Several findings deserve our attention.
First, the subsamples obtained by the pairwise intersection of outside successions (OUT), firings
(FOR), and turnovers of high-quality CEOs (HQY) generate the largest ARs: +6.57% (t-value
because of their easier interpretation.
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= 2.57), +5.73% (t-value = 3.79), and +3.80% (t-value = 2.88) for OUT & FOR; FOR & LQY;
and OUT & LQY, respectively. Even when considering alternative event windows, those pairs of
characteristics generate the strongest (and most significant) price reactions.
Second, it is of special interest to observe that forced turnovers rank 2nd and 12th (last) in this
list. In particular, when considering forced turnovers of low-quality CEOs a mean AR as large as
+5.73% is achieved (associated with a t-value of 3.79). Conversely, forced turnovers of high-quality
CEOs trigger negative and weakly significant ARs.
Finally, we note that outside CEOs yield positive abnormal returns only if the previous CEO
was fired, not if he/she voluntary left the company.
If we define subsamples based on the interaction of all three turnover characteristics, we obtain
a total of eight subsamples (23). Again, Table 4, Panel C ranks those subsamples by their abnormal
returns in the event window [-3 0]. Not surprisingly, the subsample with the most significant ARs
(Boehmer t-value = 4.41) is characterized by forced departures of low-quality CEOs substituted
by firm outsiders. The mean [-3 0]-AR of the 14 events in this category amounts to +10.58%.
The order of the subsamples defined in the columns R1, R2, and R3 in Table 4, Panel C reveal
a interesting patterns. First, the prior performance (R1) is the single most important variable
in deciding whether a turnover represents good or bad news. Turnovers of low-quality CEOs are
always associated with positive ARs, while turnovers of high-quality CEOs trigger negative ARs.
Second, column R2 impressively shows the amplifying and polarizing effect of forced turnovers in
combination with low-, and high-quality CEOs (Hypotheses 1 and 2). The fact that a CEO is
dismissed magnifies the positive (negative) abnormal returns associated with the departure of a
high-quality (low-quality) CEO. Third, in column R3 subsamples with outside successors rank con-
sistently above the corresponding subsamples with inside successors. Thus, while outside successors
are ceteris paribus judged more positively than inside successors, the other variables (departure
type and prior performance) seem to be more relevant in determining the impact on shareholder
value of CEO-turnover news.
[Table 4 about here]
4.3 Cross-Sectional Analysis of Abnormal Returns
In this subsection we evaluate the cross-sectional information content of CEO turnovers by
regressing ARs against a set of explanatory variables and controls. More precisely, we regress
[-3 0]-ARs on an outside-succession dummy (OUT), a forced-turnover dummy (FOR), a CEO-
quality dummy (HQY)12, the size of the company measured as the logarithm of total assets (SIZE),
the age of the departing CEO (AGEDEP), as well as the age of the incoming CEO (AGEINC). In
addition, we include two dummy variables that account for changes in the governance structure of
the company that are a direct consequence of the CEO turnover. DUALOLD assumes a value of
12In those cases in which the CEOs prior performance is modeled as a continuous variable it is denoted by QY
instead of HQY.
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one if the CEO change ends a dual-mandate structure, and zero otherwise. DUALNEW assumes a
value of one if the CEO change introduces a dual-mandate structure, and zero otherwise. Motivated
by the previous findings about the double-edged impact of forced turnovers in dependence of the
CEO quality, we add an interaction dummy variable, FOR×HQY, to explicitly capture this effect.
In accordance with the hypothesis that the prior performance of a CEO is crucial in assessing the
decision to fire him/her, we expect the coefficient of FOR×HQY to be negative and statistically
significant.
The regression results are reported in Table 5. Regressions 1 to 3 are univariate regressions of
ARs against a single turnover characteristic and thus simply replicate some of the results obtained
by analyzing ARs of selected subsamples. For instance, the sum of the constant, −0.0031, and the
coefficient of the variable FOR, 0.0318, in Regression 2 of Table 5 is equivalent to the mean [-3
0]-AR for the subsample of forced turnovers, 2.87%, in Table 4, Panel A. Nonetheless, performing
cross-sectional regressions offers two decisive advantages: First, it allows to measure the impact of
continuous variables (and not only dummy variables); Second, it allows to control for the effect of
multiple variables on ARs and to isolate their impact.
Not surprisingly, in the univariate regressions the coefficients related to outside successions
(OUT), forced turnovers (FOR), and the departure of high-quality CEOs (HQY) are all highly
significant. In the multivariate regression with all nine explanatory variables (Table 5, Regression
4), the coefficients and significances of the variables OUT, FOR, and HQY experience only small
changes. Surprisingly, the variable DUALNEW that indicates a governance worsening is positive
and significant. This seems to suggest that in our sample the decision of setting up a dual mandate
structure is usually taken in situations where the new CEO is considered to be particularly skilled
and enjoys the support of financial markets. The size of the company (SIZE) has a slightly neg-
ative but insignificant effect on ARs. The coefficient related to the age of the departing manager
(AGEDEP) is positive and the one related to the age of the incoming CEO (AGEINC) is negative,
however, both of them are insignificant. 15.52% of the cross-sectional variance can be traced back
to the nine variables. Most importantly for this study, the coefficient of FOR×HQY is negative and
statistically significant at the 1% confidence level13, which means that the stock market reaction is
negatively related to the quality and success of the fired CEO.
[Table 5 about here]
To investigate in more detail shareholders’ reactions to boards’ personnel decisions, we regress in
Table 6 the subsample of ARs related to CEO firings against the same set of explanatory variables
and controls.14 Overall, the regression results reinforce the previous findings. First, abnormal stock
returns are significantly lower when an outperforming CEO is fired. Second, outside appointments
yield significantly higher abnormal returns than otherwise equal inside nominations. Third, a
13When computing Regression 4 based on other event windows, the signs of the coefficients remain unchanged and
their significance levels are reasonably consistent.
14The variable DUALOLD is not included because in the sample there are no cases of forced turnovers that
interrupt a dual-mandate structure.
12
worsening of the governance structure due to the introduction of a dual-mandate is ceteris paribus
associated with higher stock returns.
[Table 6 about here]
All the empirical results presented above indicate that the dismissal of a CEO does not per se
represent good news and suggest that shareholders question whether boards of directors really act
in their best interest. Shareholders assess the quality of the board’s firing decision by considering
the quality and skills of the departing CEO as proxied by the prior relative stock performance
under his/her leadership. If the relative stock performance under the departing CEO is positive,
shareholders disfavor the board’s decision and adjust downward their estimates about the value of
the company.
This interpretation of the results stands in partial contrast to the one provided in a recent article
by Ertugrul and Krishnan (2011). They argue that CEO dismissals in the absence of poor prior
stock performance should be viewed as proactive decisions by particularly attentive boards and refer
to them as “early dismissals”. Further, the presence of negative abnormal returns after dismissals of
well-performing CEOs (early dismissals) is not seen as a market reaction to a wrong firing decision
by the board of directors but - in line with theoretical considerations of Hermalin and Weisbach
(1998) - as a consequence of a release of (superior) private information about the low quality of the
outgoing CEO. Since both hypothesis are observationally equivalent, with the available empirical
findings we cannot a priori rule out the view proposed by Ertugrul and Krishnan (2011).
To disentangle the two possible interpretations of the same empirical phenomenon, we test a
hypothesis that follows from one of the two views but not from the other. If the dismissal of a CEO
with a positive stock-price history is truly a revelation of superior private information to outside
investors by the board of directors, then we should expect abnormal returns following such events
to depend on the degree of asymmetric information between boards and investors. Thus, in cases
of weak information asymmetry, the negative relation between abnormal returns and prior CEO
performance should be less pronounced. On the contrary, if abnormal returns are not related to
the release of private information by the board of directors, information asymmetry should have no
impact on that relation. Several papers (e.g. Chang, Dasgupta, and Hilary, 2006; Bhushan, 1989)
have shown that analysts coverage (AC) is a good proxy for the degree of information (a)symmetry
between boards and outside investors. Thus, we can use the number of financial analysts following a
given stock to study whether and how information asymmetry affects the relation between abnormal
returns following CEO dismissals and their prior relative stock performance:
[-3 0]-AR = 0.0018
(0.16)
− 0.083
(−4.67)
·QY− 0.0009
(−0.08)
·QY×AC + ǫ (2)
adj.R2 = 34.19%
where AC is the total number of financial analysts following a given stock (Bloomberg data item
TOT_ANALYST_REC) and QY is the prior relative stock performance measured in the 250-day
period preceding the turnover event. The fact that the coefficient of QY×AC is far from being
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statistically different from zero suggests that information asymmetry is not a crucial variable in
explaining the negative abnormal returns following the dismissal of high-quality managers. At this
point, it is important to keep in mind that the sample used in this study is specifically designed to
focus on “clean” CEO turnover events. In the sample construction we intentionally exclude turnover
events that apparently convey a strong signal about the quality of the incumbent CEO (e.g. firings
revealing accounting fraud and other corporate scandals). Thus, the non-positive coefficient of
QY×AC might be due to the exclusion of turnover events revealing new private information about
the departing CEO.
4.4 Robustness
This subsection aims at proving the robustness of the results with respect to (i) econometric
test specifications, (ii) time subperiods, and (iii) alternative proxies of CEO quality.
Econometric Tests
One major worry in event studies concerns the risk of detecting spurious abnormal returns.
To shed light on this issue and gain insights about the reliability of the statistical inferences, we
proceed in two steps. First, we perform empirical experiments that evaluate the performance of the
two tests used in this paper – the Standardized Cross-Sectional test by Boehmer, Musumeci, and
Poulsen (1991) and the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test by Wilcoxon (1945) – and compare them with
a Bootstrap test. Second, we re-examine the most important event-study results by employing a
battery of additional parametric and non-parametric event-study tests.
The one-sided (H1: AR > 0) bootstrap event-study test used in this paper is implemented in
three steps. First, we calculate an ordinary t-value for the sample of abnormal returns: t-value =
AR/σ(AR)
√
N , where AR is the mean abnormal return, σ(AR) is the cross-sectional standard
deviation of abnormal returns, and N is the sample size (number of events). Second, we generate
a distribution of 10, 000 simulated t-values (t-valuer) under the null-hypothesis of zero abnormal
returns by drawing market-model residuals (in-sample abnormal returns) from the 250-day estima-
tion window preceding the event (from day -261 to day -11). More precisely, we generate 10, 000
samples, each consisting of N market-model residuals (one for each event) randomly-drawn from
the estimation windows. For each of the 10, 000 samples, we calculate the corresponding t-valuer
as ARr/σ(ARr)
√
N . Third, we calculate the one-sided p-value (H1: AR > 0) as the percentage of
simulated t-values above the t-value of the original sample:
p-value = (#t-valuer ≥ t-value)/10, 000. (3)
Bootstrap tests on n-day event windows are readily obtained by summing up n consecutive market-
model residuals starting on the randomly drawn event date within the 250-day estimation window.
In econometrics, the risk of erroneously rejecting the null hypothesis is referred to as error of
type I. The probability of incurring into this error should be determined by the confidence level,
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α. However, misspecified test statistics may lead to higher or lower rejection rates of true null
hypotheses. The historical-simulation experiment used to assess the accuracy of the Boehmer and
the Wilcoxon test is based on daily stock-price histories of all SPI companies in the time period
from January 1990 to June 2009. It consists of two phases.
In the first phase, we generate 250 random samples of N pseudo or “fake” CEO turnovers,
each one representing a possible empirical sample of CEO turnovers. Clearly, since the turnovers
did not actually take place, we know that the null hypothesis of zero abnormal returns is indeed
true. Consequently, we expect the event-study tests to reject the null hypothesis with frequency
α. Each of the 250 samples is constructed as follows: First, we randomly draw with replacement
N (N ∈ {10; 20; 50; 100; 200}) securities from the overall sample. Second, each sampled security
gets assigned a randomly drawn pseudo-event day which also defines the estimation and the event
window. In particular, in accordance with the event-study design employed in the paper, the
estimation window covers the time period between −260 and −11 days before the event date.15
In the second phase, we conduct for each of the 250 pseudo-turnover samples a complete event-
study test by (i) estimating the market model by OLS, (ii) calculating abnormal returns in the
event window, and (iii) determining the rejection of the null hypothesis based on a particular test
and confidence level, α.
The rejection rates reported in Table 7 represent the percentage of samples for which abnormal
returns are found to be significantly different from zero. Since for all three models the test statistics
reject the null hypothesis with a frequency comparable to the significance levels, the Type I error
rate is acceptable and the tests do not seem prone to detect spurious abnormal returns. Interestingly,
the rather involved Bootstrap event-study test does not seem to deliver better results than the other
two test statistics.
[Table 7 about here]
To further ensure the robustness of the findings, we re-examine the empirical results by imple-
menting an additional battery of parametric and non-parametric event-study tests. The parametric
methods include the Traditional test by Brown and Warner (1980), the Portfolio test by Brown
and Warner (1980), a test that accounts for first-order autocorrelation in abnormal stock returns
by Ruback (1982), and the Standardized-Residual test by Patell (1976). The non-parametric tests
employed in this study include the mentioned Bootstrap test, the Corrado Rank test by Corrado
(1989), and the Generalized Rank test by Kolari and Pynnonen (2008). The non-parametric test
statistics have the advantage of avoiding the assumption of a specific distribution for the abnormal
returns. Table 8 reports t-values associated with different tests, event windows, and CEO-turnover
subsamples. It is reassuring to observe that the significant results obtained earlier for forced de-
partures are even stronger when considering the additional tests (Panel B). The significant positive
abnormal returns in connection with forced turnovers of low-quality CEOs (Hypothesis 1) is con-
firmed by all test statistics (Panel C). Finally, the majority of tests indicate significant negative
15To estimate the market model, we require the companies to be a member of the Swiss Performance Index during
all 261 days prior to the randomly drawn event date. If this condition is not fulfilled a new pseudo event day is
randomly assigned to this security. This cycle continues until a complete history of security returns is generated.
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returns around forced turnovers of high-quality CEOs (Hypothesis 2, Panel D).
[Table 8 about here]
Time Subperiods
To test the stability of the results over time, we divide the sample into two subperiods of equal
length (1998-2003 and 2004-2009) and re-run cross-sectional regressions for the sample of all CEO
turnovers and the subsample of CEO firings. Regardless of the time subsample (almost) all the
coefficients in Table 9 have the expected sign (except for HQY in the first regression). In the
regressions based on all CEO turnovers, the coefficients of FOR*HQY are consistently negative
and statistically significant. Similarly, in the regressions based on the subsample of forced CEO
turnovers prior performance enters the regression with a negative and significant coefficient. Thus,
the dependence of the announcement impact of forced turnovers on the prior performance is a fea-
ture that is present in both subperiods. Finally, the cross-sectional regressions in the subperiod
1998-2003 have a higher explanatory power in terms of R2 than those in the subperiod 2004-2009.
[Table 9 about here]
Alternative Proxies of CEO Quality
As a further robustness check, we test whether the results of the cross-sectional regressions
obtained in Table 6, regression 3 also hold for alternative performance-based proxies of CEO quality.
In a first robustness check, the estimation period of the prior performance is varied and the cross-
sectional regressions are re-calculated by employing estimation periods of 50, 125, 250 (default),
375, and 500 days (Table 10). For all estimation periods the coefficient of the CEO-quality variable
is negative and statistically significant.
[Table 10 about here]
In a second robustness check, we consider, as an alternative measure of CEO quality, the prior
relative stock performance computed against an industry index (instead of a broad stock-market
index). The companies are classified according to 15 different industry sectors as provided by
Datastream.16 Following this calculation, QYIA is the prior realized relative stock performance
measured against the corresponding industry index during the one-year period preceding the CEO-
turnover announcement. Clearly, the two prior-performance measures that serve as a proxy of
managerial CEO quality (QY and QYIA) are not identical. However, these measures do not lead to a
16The industries are: health care, utilities, travel & leisure, retail, media, chemicals, basic resources, banks,
insurance, financial services, technology, construction & material, industrials, food & beverage, and personal goods.
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very different classification of CEOs: 81.3% (81.7%) of (forced) managers classified as “high-quality”
based on industry-adjustment are also “high-quality” based on the standard market adjustment.
Table 11 shows that in all four regressions the performance variable QYIA still has a negative
coefficient and is highly significant. Thus, the importance of CEO quality in explaining the stock-
market reaction does not crucially depend on the specific choice of the CEO-quality proxy.
[Table 11 about here]
5 Operating Performance
As mentioned in the introduction, accounting-based performance measures can be used as an
alternative way to assess the value of a CEO turnover. Several papers investigate the impact of
CEO changes on key accounting-based performance measures (e.g. Denis and Denis, 1995; Khurana,
2001; Dedman and Lin, 2002; Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino, 2004; Fisman, Khurana, and Rhodes-
Kropf, 2005; Hillier and McColgan, 2005; Dezso, 2007; Dimopoulos and Wagner, 2010). Typically,
these papers evidence that a forced CEO-turnover is preceded by deteriorating accounting figures
which improve after the new CEO takes up his/her position.
In this section of the paper, we investigate whether the quality of the dismissed CEO is an
important variable in explaining the subsequent changes in operating performance. Thus, we inves-
tigate whether the development of the operating performance of a company reflects the short-term
stock-price impact of CEO-turnover announcements. If we assume that markets are efficient, abnor-
mal stock returns should reflect investors’ perceptions about fundamental changes in the value of
the company. According to basic valuation principles, the fundamental value of a company results
from the sum of all the expected future free cash flows discounted at the appropriate risk-adjusted
interest rate. Thus, changes in the value of a company reflect either (i) changes in the relevant
discount rate or (ii) changes in the expected future cash flows (or both). If we rule out that a CEO
turnover has an impact on the relevant discount rate,17 the difference in the company valuation
before and after the CEO-turnover announcement will solely reflect changes in the expected cash
flows and thus in the future operating performance of that company.
5.1 Changes in OROA
The long-term impact of CEO turnovers is measured using the operating return on assets
(OROA). We calculate the operating return on total assets in period t, OROAt, as the ratio of
operating income (Datastream item 137) and book value of total assets (Datastream item 392). We
do not consider the return on assets in the financial year of the CEO turnover because it is affected
17A change in the discount rate would be appropriate if the average successor reduced the systematic risk of a
company or had an impact on the market risk premium. A comparison of betas before and after the event date
seems to rule out the first hypothesis, while the latter appears implausible.
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by both the old and the new CEO.18 Therefore, OROA0 indicates the operating return on assets of
the financial year ending before the CEO turnover and OROA+1 denotes the return corresponding
to the first full-time year under the lead of the new CEO.
The development of median OROA changes is depicted in Figure 3. Similar to Denis and De-
nis (1995), Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino (2004), and Dezso (2007), we find that forced CEO
turnovers (Figure 3b) are generally preceded by deteriorating operating performance and followed
by a steady increase in profitability. Strikingly, while the same U-shape pattern in OROAs can
be observed for the subsample of low-quality CEO dismissals (Figure 3c), the subsample of forced
departures of high-quality CEOs is characterized by a completely different OROA development:
The median change in operating performance is positive and increasing before the firing and gets
negative afterward.
[Figure 3 about here]
Table 12 provides econometric tests on OROA changes. Panel B of this table confirms that
OROAs associated with for forced CEO turnovers significantly worsen in the run-up to the turnover
and improve afterward. For the purposes of this paper, it is particularly interesting to compare
OROA changes following forced departures of low-quality CEOs (Panel C) to OROA changes fol-
lowing forced departures of high-quality CEOs (Panel D). Three considerations can be made. First,
similar to Panel A (total sample) and Panel B (forced turnovers), the dismissal of a low-quality
CEO is (not surprisingly) preceded by decreasing operating performance. Second, operating per-
formance does not significantly change before the dismissal of a high-quality CEO. Third, and most
importantly, changes in operating performance after a CEO turnover crucially differ depending on
the quality of the dismissed CEO. Both mean and median OROAs increase after the firing of a low-
quality CEO. Especially, in the [0 2]-year event window, mean and median OROA changes amount
to +8.82% and +2.13% with t-values of = 2.29 and = 2.35. On the contrary, mean and median
OROA changes following the firing of high-quality CEOs tend to be negative, although statistical
significance is weak. Thus, the previously-detected difference in abnormal returns following the
dismissal of low- and high-quality CEOs seem to be reflected in the evolution of firm profitability.
[Table 12 about here]
5.2 Cross-Sectional Analysis of Operating Performance
To refine the analysis on the importance of CEO quality in explaining the impact of turnovers
on the operating performance, we consider different measures of abnormal operating performance
18It is often argued that departing CEOs have incentives to artificially increase reported earnings in a last attempt
to keep their position. Conversely, a newly appointed CEO has an incentive to reduce reported earnings to credit
the predecessor with poor performance and obtain the merits of the subsequent increase in performance. The second
mentioned discretionary behavior is known in the literature as “earnings bath” (Elliott and Shaw, 1988; DeAngelo,
1988; Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993; Pourciau, 1993; Wells, 2002).
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and perform cross-sectional regressions against the same explanatory and control variables used in
the analysis of abnormal stock returns (Section 4). Abnormal operating performance is obtained
by comparing the realized operating performance of a company, OROAt, with a measure of its
normal, or expected, operating performance. We follow Barber and Lyon (1996) and consider three
models to determine the expected operating performance of a company. Accordingly, we obtain
three different measures for the abnormal operating performance:
1. Lagged-Adjusted OROA19: LA-OROAi,t = OROAi,t −OROAi,t−1
2. Industry-Adjusted OROA: IA-OROAi,t = OROAi,t −OROAIi,t
3. Lagged-Industry-Adjusted OROA: LIA-OROAi,t = OROAi,t − (OROAi,t−1 +∆OROAIi,t)
where OROA
I
i,t is the median industry OROA (without considering company i) and ∆OROA
I
i,t
is the change in the median industry OROA from year t − 1 to year t. The median OROA of an
industry is calculated starting from a sample of current and past SPI companies. First, we consider
all companies with the same “Sector 4” industry code of Datastream for which financial statements
are available. If less than three companies are in the same “Sector 4” industry, we consider all
companies in the larger “Sector 3” industry group. If even with this broader industry definition we
cannot find at least three companies with available OROAs, we use all SPI companies.
Table 13 shows the results of regressing abnormal OROAs against a set of explanatory variables
and controls. The samples used in the cross-sectional analysis of abnormal operating performance
are smaller than those used for the event studies on abnormal returns because of the lack of account-
ing data for some of the companies in our sample. The fact that in all regressions the coefficients
of FOR*HQY are negative is consistent with the view that the performance impact of forced CEO
turnovers is much lower when a manager with a positive performance record is dismissed. In this
respect, the cross-sectional regressions based on operating performance reinforce the importance
of the CEO quality in assessing the success of a board’s firing decision. The slightly lower signifi-
cances of the FOR*HQY coefficients in the cross-sectional regressions based on abnormal OROAs
(see Table 13) than in those with abnormal returns (see Table 5) is likely due to the large number
of confounding shocks affecting the long-term development of operating performance.
[Table 13 about here]
6 Summary and Conclusions
We investigate the information content of CEO-turnover announcements by analyzing abnormal
stock returns and operating performance in a hand-collected sample of 208 “clean” turnover events
19The lagged-adjusted OROA (LA-OROA) corresponds to the changes in OROA used in Subsection 5.1 and plotted
in Figure 3.
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between January 1998 and June 2009. Unlike the majority of previous studies, we show that forced
turnovers do not per se represent positive news to shareholders. On the contrary, investors seem
to critically assess the board’s firing decision by considering the company’s prior relative stock
performance under the departing CEO as a proxy for his/her quality. Forced turnovers of low-
quality CEOs are associated with positive and significant abnormal returns. On the contrary, the
dismissal of outperforming CEOs - an event that occurs in as many as 35% of all forced turnovers
in our sample - triggers on average negative abnormal stock returns.
The different market reaction in dependence of the quality of the dismissed CEO is confirmed
in multivariate cross-sectional regressions, holds for different time sub-periods, and is robust to
various event-test specifications and proxies of CEO quality. By studying the impact of information
asymmetries (measured by analyst coverage) on abnormal returns, we rule out the hypothesis that
the negative abnormal returns after dismissals of well-performing CEOs are due to the release of
negative information privately held by the board of directors. Finally, we show that the CEO
quality of dismissed managers is also reflected in the development of companies’ operating return
on assets. While the operating performance significantly increases after the dismissal of low-quality
CEOs, it does not improve after the forced departure of high-quality CEOs.
To conclude, this paper suggests that a large portion of forced CEO turnovers, namely those
concerning CEOs with a positive performance record, trigger negative abnormal returns and do not
improve companies’ operating performance. Thus, those firing decisions do not comply with the
shareholders’ best interests.
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Table 1: Related Empirical Literature on CEO Turnovers
This table provides an overview of important empirical contributions that study the impact of CEO-turnover announcements on shareholder value. The table provides
information about the market investigated (Market), the time period covered by the empirical sample (Years), the executive position under investigation (Pos.), the
number of management turnovers considered in the widest sample (Sample), the event window used for calculating abnormal returns (Window), and test results
related Succession Type (OUT denotes outside and INS inside successions) and Departure Type (FOR denotes forced and VOL voluntary turnovers). In spite of the
clear-cut classification provided in this table, the studies can differ in the specific mechanisms used to classify turnovers. Furthermore, in the last column we indicate
whether the study also examines the impact of CEO turnovers on return on assets (ROA). ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
confidence level, respectively, in a two-tailed test.
Authors Market Years Pos. Sample Window A1: Succession Type A2: Departure Type ROA
OUT INS FOR VOL
Reinganum (1985) USA 1978–1979 Top 353 [0] 1.17%** -0.13% – – −
Beatty and Zajac (1987) USA 1979–1980 CEO 209 [0] 0.10% 0.00% – – −
Furtado and Rozeff (1987) USA 1975–1982 Top 323 [0 1] 0.72% 1.05%*** 1.03%** – −
Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988) USA 1963–1978 Top 230 [-1 0] 0.34%** – 0.14% – −
Mahajan and Lummer (1993) USA 1972–1983 Top 498 [-1 0] – – -0.73%* 0.21% −
Worrell, Davidson, and Glascock (1993) USA 1963–1987 Top 62 [-1 0] -1.17% 0.83% 0.38% – −
Park and Rozeff (1994) USA 1979–1986 CEO 385 [-1 0] 0.61% -0.34% – – X
Denis and Denis (1995) USA 1985–1988 CEO 328 [-1 0] – – 2.50%*** 0.61% X
Khanna and Poulsen (1995) USA 1980–1990 Top 121 [-1 0] -0.26% 0.00% – – −
Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001) USA 1971–1995 CEO 854 [-2 2] 2.49%*** – 2.02%*** – −
Shen and Cannella (2003) USA 1988–1997 CEO 177 [-1 1] 1.95%*** – – – −
Adams and Mansi (2009) USA 1973–2000 CEO 674 [-1 1] 2.42%*** 0.15% 2.43%*** 0.27%** −
Dahya, Lonie, and Power (1998) UK 1989–1992 Top 105 [-1 0] – – 0.12%** -0.02% −
Dedman and Lin (2002) UK 1990–1995 CEO 251 [-1 1] – – -3.40%*** 0.13% X
Dahya and McConnell (2005) UK 1988–1999 CEO 523 [-1 0] 0.79%*** 0.20% – – −
Hillier and McColgan (2005) UK 1993–1998 CEO 462 [-1 1] – – 11.82% 0.92%** X
Dherment-Ferere and Renneboog (2002) FR 1988–1992 CEO 92 [-1 0] – – 0.50% 0.40% −
Kang and Shivdasani (1996) JP 1985–1990 CEO 432 [-1 0] 0.95%** 0.38%** 1.02%** 0.40%** −
Setiawan (2008) ID 1992–2003 CEO 59 [0] 0.90% -2.30% -1.20% 0.00% −
Neumann and Voetmann (2005) DK 1994–1998 CEO 81 [-1 1] – – 1.10%** -1.00%** −
Danisevska, de Jong, and Rosellon (2003) NL 1993–1999 CEO 84 [0 1] – – -0.54% – −
Cools and van Praag (2007) NL 1991–1999 Top 227 [0 1] – – 0.97% – −
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Table 2: Statistics on CEO Turnovers in the Sample
This Table provides a breakdown of the final sample by year and turnover characteristics. Total Turnover indicates the number of all CEO turnovers during a particular
year. Successor Origin is subdivided into the categories Insider (INS) and Outsider (OUT). Departure Type is subdivided into the categories Forced (FOR) and
Voluntary (VOL). CEO quality is subdivided into the categories low-quality (LQY) and high-quality (HQY). CEO quality is measured by the prior relative stock-price
performance relative to a broad market index (SPI) in the one-year period preceding the CEO-turnover announcement date.
Year Total Turnovers Successor Origin Departure Type CEO Quality
INS OUT VOL FOR LQY HQY
1998 5 3 2 2 3 4 1
1999 10 10 0 9 1 8 2
2000 13 8 5 12 1 8 5
2001 16 8 8 11 5 11 5
2002 24 14 10 12 12 21 3
2003 17 13 4 10 7 8 9
2004 26 16 10 22 4 11 15
2005 11 6 5 7 4 6 5
2006 25 17 8 20 5 13 12
2007 29 22 7 21 8 10 19
2008 19 9 10 15 4 8 11
2009 13 7 6 7 6 10 3
Total 208 133 75 148 60 118 90
Total % 100% 64% 36% 71% 29% 57% 43%
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Table 3: Abnormal Returns
This table reports the mean and median abnormal stock returns obtained from an event study of CEO-turnover announcements. As
indicated in column 1 of the table the abnormal returns refer to different event windows. Mean and median abnormal returns are shown
in column 2 and column 4, respectively. The table presents results both for the entire sample (Panel A) and for selected subsamples
(Panels B-D). The parameters for the market model are estimated over a period of 250 trading days ending 11 days prior the CEO
turnover announcement. The one-sided event-study test statistics are the Standardized cross-sectional test by Boehmer, Musumeci, and
Poulsen (1991) (t-value) and the Wilcoxon signed rank test (z-value). ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% confidence level, respectively.
Days Mean t-Value Median z-Value
Abnormal Return Abnormal Return
Panel A: Total Sample (N = 208)
[-3 0] 0.61% 1.1387 0.17% 1.0540
[-1 0] 0.48% 1.0324 -0.01% 0.3003
[-1 1] 0.56%* 1.4998 0.33% 0.7962
-2 0.17% 0.6078 0.07% 1.2668
-1 0.09% -0.2802 -0.09% 0.6328
0 0.39%* 1.3533 0.02% 0.7583
Panel B: Forced Departure (N = 60)
[-3 0] 2.87%** 1.8488 0.25%** 2.0612
[-1 0] 2.28%** 1.7403 0.58% 1.2294
[-1 1] 1.93% 1.2356 0.33% 0.7288
-2 0.38% 0.0744 0.00% 0.6994
-1 0.57% 0.6958 -0.05% 0.3828
0 1.70%* 1.6393 0.32% 1.2147
Panel C: Forced Departure of Low-Quality CEOs – H1 (N = 39)
[-3 0] 5.73%*** 3.7868 5.03%*** 3.4050
[-1 0] 4.05%** 2.3431 2.34%** 2.0793
[-1 1] 3.78%** 2.0953 2.90%* 1.6048
-2 0.99%* 1.4132 0.36%* 1.6327
-1 1.12%* 1.6254 0.13% 1.2001
0 2.93%** 1.9006 1.21%** 1.8839
Panel D: Forced Departure of High-Quality CEOs – H2 (N = 21)
[-3 0] -2.44%* -1.5566 -0.78%** 1.8595
[-1 0] -1.01% -1.2754 -1.51%** 1.6857
[-1 1] -1.51%* -1.4566 -1.22%* 1.5120
-2 -0.75% -1.0054 -0.23% 1.1644
-1 -0.43%* -1.3346 -0.17%* 1.3382
0 -0.58% -0.3430 -0.08% 0.9906
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Table 4: Abnormal-Return Ranking for Subsamples
This table shows the abnormal-return rankings for subsamples based on the turnover characteristics successor origin (OUT denotes
outside and INS inside successions), departure type (FOR denotes forced and VOL voluntary turnovers), and CEO quality (HQY denotes
high- and LQY low-quality CEOs). The subsamples are constructed based on one (Panel A), two (Panel B), and three (Panel C) turnover
characteristics. Rank indicates the position of the subsamples with respect to the mean AR in the event window [-3 0] (Mean AR [-3
0]). Sample Restriction identifies the sample construction based on one, two, or three sample criteria as listed under R1, R2, and R3. N
indicates the number of CEO turnovers included in each subsample. Finally, t-value indicates the test statistics obtained by a one-sided
Boehmer test (Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen, 1991). ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence
level, respectively.
Rank Sample Restriction N Mean t-Value
R1 R2 R3 AR [-3 0]
Panel A: Restriction on One Turnover Characteristics
1 FOR - - 60 2.87%** 1.8488
2 LQY - - 118 2.07%*** 3.4958
3 OUT - - 75 1.76%** 2.0340
4 INS - - 133 -0.04% 0.1792
5 VOL - - 148 -0.31% -0.0772
6 HQY - - 90 -1.30%** -1.8043
Panel B: Restriction on Two Turnover Characteristics
1 OUT FOR - 21 6.57%*** 2.5692
2 FOR LQY - 39 5.73%*** 3.7868
3 OUT LQY - 42 3.80%*** 2.8765
4 INS LQY - 76 1.10%** 2.2874
5 INS FOR - 39 0.88% 0.8352
6 VOL LQY - 79 0.25%* 1.3326
7 OUT VOL - 54 -0.10% 0.7120
8 INS VOL - 94 -0.43% -0.5112
9 OUT HQY - 33 -0.83% -0.3372
10 VOL HQY - 69 -0.95% -1.1528
11 INS HQY - 57 -1.57%** -1.8316
12 FOR HQY - 21 -2.44%* -1.5566
Panel C: Restriction on Three Turnover Characteristics
1 LQY FOR OUT 14 10.58%*** 4.4161
2 LQY FOR INS 25 3.02%** 2.1522
3 LQY VOL OUT 28 0.41% 0.7881
4 LQY VOL INS 51 0.17% 1.0639
5 HQY VOL OUT 26 -0.66% 0.1990
6 HQY VOL INS 43 -1.13%* -1.4027
7 HQY FOR OUT 7 -1.46%* -1.8437
8 HQY FOR INS 14 -2.94% -1.1631
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Table 5: Cross-Sectional Regressions of Abnormal Returns
This table reports the results of regressing the [-3 0]-abnormal returns on a set of explanatory variables. The sample consists of 208
CEO turnovers over the time period between December 1998 and June 2009. Outside successions and forced departures are denoted by
OUT and FOR, respectively. HQY is a dummy variable that indicates a high-quality CEO. The variable assumes a value of one if the
company outperformed the market in the year preceding the turnover. SIZE denotes the logarithm of total assets, AGEDEP the age of
the departing CEO and AGEINC of the appointed CEO. DUALOLD assumes a value of one if the CEO turnover ends a dual-mandate
structure and zero otherwise. DUALNEW assumes a value of one if the CEO turnover introduces a dual-mandate structure and zero
otherwise. FOR*HQY is a dummy variable denoting forced turnovers of high-quality CEOs. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively, and the corresponding t-values are depicted in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CONST -0.0004 -0.0031 0.0207*** 0.0316 0.0045 -0.0043
(-0.0780) (-0.5917) (3.5533) (0.1897) (0.6291) (-0.5590)
OUT 0.0181** 0.0185** 0.0188** 0.0198**
(1.9345) (2.0846) (2.1200) (2.2756)
FOR 0.0318*** 0.0524*** 0.0285*** 0.0491***
(3.2648) (4.0341) (3.0118) (4.0195)
HQY -0.0337*** -0.0133* -0.0311*** -0.0129*
(-3.8108) (-1.3286) (-3.5958) (-1.3150)
SIZE -0.0014
(-0.7755)
AGEDEP 0.0129
(0.3972)
AGEINC -0.0175
(-0.5660)
DUALOLD -0.0054 -0.0053
(-0.3552) (0.6236)
DUALNEW 0.0321* 0.0303*
(1.6134) (1.5587)
FOR*HQY -0.0650*** -0.0643***
(-3.3593) (-3.3653)
adj. R2 0.0131 0.0446 0.0613 0.1552 0.1105 0.1633
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Table 6: Cross-Sectional Regressions for Forced Turnovers
This table reports the results of regressing the abnormal returns of forced turnovers from the period [−3 0] on a set of explanatory
variables. The sample consists of 60 forced CEO turnovers in the time period between 1998 and 2009. OUT denotes outside successions.
QY denotes prior stock performance relative to the market. SIZE denotes the logarithm of total assets, AGEDEP the age of the departing
CEO and AGEINC of the appointed CEO. DUALOLD assumes a value of one if the CEO turnover ends a dual-mandate structure and
zero otherwise. DUALNEW assumes a value of one if the CEO turnover introduces a dual-mandate structure and zero otherwise. ***,
**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively, and the corresponding t-values are depicted
in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CONST 0.0088 0.0020 0.1245 -0.0085 -0.0160*
(0.6519) (0.1908) (0.3188) (-0.7354) (-1.3059)
OUT 0.0569*** 0.0429** 0.0351** 0.0416**
(2.4898) (2.1028) (1.8232) (2.1532)
QY -0.0841*** -0.0756*** -0.0785*** -0.0760***
(-5.7634) (-5.0353) (-5.3583) (-5.2467)
SIZE 0.0016
(0.4880)
AGEDEP -0.0246
(-0.3197)
AGEINC -0.0175
(-0.2817)
DUALNEW 0.0461* 0.0446**
(1.6614) (1.6792)
adj. R2 0.0810 0.3532 0.3678 0.3781 0.3973
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Table 7: Rejection Rates for Different Event-Study Tests
This table shows the empirical rejection rates for the Bootstrap, the Standardized cross-sectional (Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen,
1991), and the Wilcoxon signed rank test when there is no abnormal return present in the data. The underlying sample for this historical
simulation includes all SPI companies in the period from January 1990 to June 2009. This initial sample is employed to generate 250
random samples by choosing each time randomly a number of securities, N (N ∈ {10; 20; 50; 100}) with replacement. The Bootstrap
test was conducted by resampling 10, 000 times from our initial sample of abnormal returns. The rejection rates of the simulations are
obtained in a two-tailed test.
Method Number of Events
10 20 50 100 200
Panel A: Significance Level 10%
Bootstrap 10.80% 9.60% 10.00% 10.00% 11.60%
Boehmer 7.60% 8.00% 10.80% 8.40% 12.00%
Wilcoxon 8.80% 9.20% 10.00% 9.20% 15.20%
Panel B: Significance Level 5%
Bootstrap 6.40% 6.00% 4.00% 5.60% 6.80%
Boehmer 5.20% 5.20% 4.80% 4.80% 7.20%
Wilcoxon 2.00% 5.60% 6.00% 4.80% 4.80%
Panel C: Significance Level 1%
Bootstrap 1.60% 1.60% 1.60% 1.20% 1.60%
Boehmer 0.00% 0.80% 1.20% 0.80% 1.60%
Wilcoxon 0.00% 0.00% 0.80% 0.40% 1.60%
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Table 8: Robustness of Abnormal Returns
This table shows the significance of nine event-study tests for abnormal stock returns. The test statistics are the Traditional and the Portfolio test (Brown and
Warner, 1980), the Standardized-residual test (Patell, 1976), the Ruback (1982) test, the Standardized cross-sectional test (Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen, 1991),
a Bootstrap test, the Corrado (1989) rank test, the Generalized rank test (Kolari and Pynnonen, 2008) and the Wilcoxon signed rank test Wilcoxon (1945). All results
refer to one-sided tests. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively.
Days Traditional Portfolio Patell Ruback Boehmer Bootstrap Corrado Rank Gen. Rank Wilcoxon
Panel A: Total Sample (N = 208)
[-3 0] 1.5110* 1.5123* 1.7018** 1.5903* 1.1387 1.3349* 1.1784 1.4608* 1.0540
[-2 0] 1.8642** 1.8657** 1.9079** 1.9505** 1.1578 1.4542* 1.2050 1.5761* 1.1679
[-1 1] 1.6102* 1.6115* 2.5316*** 1.6847** 1.4998* 1.1566 1.2431 1.5643* 0.7962
-1 0.4332 0.4335 -0.3368 0.4335 -0.2802 0.3873 -0.5469 -0.4532 0.6328
0 1.9282** 1.9298** 2.9139*** 1.9298** 1.3533* 1.1070 1.3964* 1.4749* 0.7583
1 0.4275 0.4279 1.8257** 0.4279 1.3964* 0.3733 1.3036* 1.3829* 0.6651
Panel B: Forced Departure (N = 60)
[-3 0] 3.1343*** 3.2192*** 3.3307*** 3.2101*** 1.8488** 2.5427*** 1.7135** 2.3262** 2.0612**
[-2 0] 3.3488*** 3.4395*** 3.1122*** 3.4308*** 1.5253* 2.2672** 1.4308* 2.1035** 1.7153**
[-1 1] 2.4273*** 2.4930*** 2.6129*** 2.4867*** 1.2356 1.3077* 0.7114 1.0772 0.7288
-1 1.2521 1.2860 0.9460 1.2860 0.6958 1.0205 0.4701 0.5193 0.3828
0 3.7204*** 3.8212*** 4.3514*** 3.8212*** 1.6393* 1.6933** 1.5433* 1.5870* 1.2147
1 -0.7683 -0.7891 -0.7534 -0.7891 -0.5120 -0.5074 -0.7812 -0.7256 0.7877
Panel C: Forced Departure of Low-Quality CEOs – H1 (N = 39)
[-3 0] 4.3710*** 4.4429*** 6.1012*** 4.4925*** 3.7868*** 4.1047*** 3.8432*** 4.0071*** 3.4050***
[-2 0] 4.4321*** 4.5050*** 5.5948*** 4.5496*** 2.7606*** 3.2470*** 2.9221*** 3.0426*** 2.7491***
[-1 1] 3.3258*** 3.3805*** 4.8074*** 3.4139*** 2.0953** 1.8165** 2.0575** 1.8261** 1.6048*
-1 1.6997** 1.7276** 2.2981** 1.7276** 1.6254* 1.3526* 1.3905* 1.4252* 1.2001
0 4.4710*** 4.5446*** 5.7886*** 4.5446*** 1.9006** 1.9974** 2.1657** 2.1968** 1.8839**
1 -0.4103 -0.4171 0.2737 -0.4171 0.1737 -0.2339 0.0074 0.0485 0.3628
Panel D: Forced Departure of High-Quality CEOs – H2 (N = 21)
[-3 0] -2.5461*** -2.6194*** -2.6847*** -2.6276*** -1.5566* -1.9568** -2.3167** -1.3907* 1.8595**
[-2 0] -2.1157** -2.1766** -2.3638** -2.1827** -1.3387* -1.6367* -1.5529* -0.7838 1.3729*
[-1 1] -1.8213** -1.8737** -2.1347** -1.8789** -1.4566* -1.7882** -1.5757* -1.0560 1.5120*
-1 -0.8993 -0.9251 -1.5327* -0.9251 -1.3346* -0.8885 -1.0824 -1.0484 1.3382*
0 -1.2004 -1.2349 -0.5332 -1.2349 -0.3430 -0.9789 -0.3645 -0.3336 0.9906
1 -1.0549 -1.0853 -1.6465* -1.0853 -1.3177 -1.0958 -1.2822* -1.2474 1.0949
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Table 9: Cross-Sectional Regressions for Sub-Periods
This table reports the results of regressing the [-3 0]-abnormal returns on a set of variables. The total sample as well as the sample
of forced turnovers is split in two sub-periods. The first sub-period starts in 1998 and ends in 2003 and the second sub-period lasts
from 2004 to 2009. Outside successions and forced departures are denoted by OUT and FOR, respectively. QY denotes prior stock
performance relative to the market. HQY is a dummy variable that indicates a high-quality CEO. The variable assumes a value of one if
the company outperformed the market in the year preceding the turnover. SIZE denotes the logarithm of total assets, AGEDEP the age
of the departing CEO and AGEINC of the appointed CEO. DUALOLD assumes a value of one if the CEO turnover ends a dual-mandate
structure and zero otherwise. DUALNEW assumes a value of one if the CEO turnover introduces a dual-mandate structure and zero
otherwise. FOR*HQY is a dummy variable denoting forced turnovers of high-quality CEOs. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively, and the corresponding t-values are depicted in parentheses.
All Turnovers Forced Turnovers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1998-2003 2004-2009 1998-2003 2004-2009
(N = 85) (N = 123) (N = 31) (N = 29)
CONST -0.0114 0.0010 -0.0110 -0.0206
(-0.9650) (0.0985) (-0.5768) (-1.2251)
OUT 0.0283** 0.0158* 0.0339 0.0497**
(1.8386) (1.5351) (1.0825) (1.8973)
FOR 0.0660*** 0.0284**
(3.5687) (1.7247)
QY -0.0755*** -0.0744**
(-3.9867) (-2.3166)
HQY -0.0016 -0.0180*
(-0.0805) (-1.5631)
DUALOLD -0.0410 0.0053
(-0.1254) (1.1294)
DUALNEW 0.0568* 0.0202 0.0485 0.0428
(1.5929) (0.8962) (1.0153) (1.2803)
FOR*HQY -0.0974*** -0.0365*
(-2.8543) (-1.5657)
adj. R2 0.2337 0.0793 0.4253 0.2353
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Table 10: Cross-Sectional Regression for Forced Turnovers with Different Performance Periods
This table reports the results of regressing the [-3 0]-abnormal returns of forced CEO turnovers on a set of variables. Outside successions
and forced departures are denoted by OUT and FOR, respectively. QY denotes prior stock performance relative to the market measured
over different time periods, i.e. 50, 125, 250 (standard estimation period), 375, and 500 days. SIZE denotes the logarithm of total assets,
AGEDEP the age of the departing CEO and AGEINC of the appointed CEO. DUALNEW assumes a value of one if the CEO turnover
introduces a dual-mandate structure and zero otherwise. The differing number of CEO turnovers is due to the restriction of at least 40%
trading days in the estimation window for the market model and the availablity of a time series of up to 500 days of returns. ***, **,
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively, and the corresponding t-values are depicted
in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
50 days 125 days 250 days 375 days 500 days
(N = 59) (N = 58) (N = 60) (N = 59) (N = 57)
CONST 0.0276 -0.018 0.1245 0.0799 -0.0177
(0.0663) (-0.0445) (0.3188) (0.1871) (-0.0411)
OUT 0.0481** 0.0446** 0.0429** 0.0469** 0.047**
(2.153) (2.0242) (2.1028) (2.0798) (2.0782)
QY -0.1842*** -0.0879*** -0.0756*** -0.0465*** -0.0489***
(-4.3257) (-4.1397) (-5.0353) (-3.4235) (-3.4212)
SIZE 0.0005 0.0014 0.0016 0.0011 0.0015
(0.1415) (0.3932) (0.488) (0.3097) (0.4169)
AGEDEP 0.0211 0.016 -0.0246 -0.0165 0.0139
(0.2549) (0.1997) (-0.3197) (-0.1957) (0.1613)
AGEINC -0.0323 -0.0196 -0.0175 -0.0117 -0.0195
(-0.4748) (-0.3015) (-0.2817) (-0.175) (-0.2909)
DUALNEW 0.0637** 0.062** 0.0461* 0.0517** 0.0479*
(2.1449) (2.1662) (1.6614) (1.7259) (1.5103)
adj. R2 0.3081 0.3057 0.3678 0.2470 0.2391
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Table 11: Cross-Sectional Regression for Forced Turnovers with Industry-Adjusted Performance
This table reports the results of regressing the abnormal returns of forced turnovers from the period [−3 0] on a set of explanatory
variables. The sample consists of 60 forced CEO turnovers in the time period between 1998 and 2009. OUT denotes outside successions.
QYIA denotes prior stock performance relative to the corresponding industry index. SIZE denotes the logarithm of total assets,
AGEDEP the age of the departing CEO and AGEINC of the appointed CEO. DUALNEW assumes a value of one if the CEO turnover
introduces a dual-mandate structure and zero otherwise. DUALOLD is not used in this regression because there was no forced departure
of a CEO holding also the position as a director of the board. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
confidence level, respectively, and the corresponding t-values are depicted in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CONST 0.0101 0.0096 -0.0030 -0.0117
(0.9234) (0.9219) (-0.2492) (-0.9251)
OUT 0.0487** 0.0479** 0.0471**
(2.2026) (2.2675) (2.3478)
QYIA -0.0810*** -0.0726*** -0.0749*** -0.0730***
(-4.8838) (-4.3461) (-4.5541) (-4.5160)
SIZE 0.0018
(0.5118)
AGEDEP -0.0318
(-0.3963)
AGEINC -0.0279
(-0.4307)
DUALNEW 0.0528** 0.0504**
(1.8276) (1.8200)
adj. R2 0.2792 0.3109 0.3143 0.3411
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Table 12: Changes in Operating Performance
This table shows mean and median changes in operating performance for different subsamples and event windows. ***, **, and * denote
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively, for two-tailed tests.
Years N Mean t-Value Median z-Value
OROA Change OROA Change
Panel A: Total Sample
[-2 0] 196 -2.45%*** -2.7789 -0.38%*** 3.4660
[-1 0] 201 -2.65%* -1.8763 -0.22%*** 2.7147
[0 1] 185 2.62% 0.6184 0.30% 0.5231
[0 2] 162 3.40%*** 2.6476 0.36%** 2.0293
Panel B: Forced Departures
[-2 0] 57 -5.40%* -1.9826 -0.63%*** 3.9289
[-1 0] 59 -3.80% -1.3375 -0.46%* 1.7436
[0 1] 51 4.36% 0.5596 0.59% 0.0281
[0 2] 46 5.61% 1.4054 0.91% 1.3384
Panel C: Forced Departure of Low-Quality CEOs
[-2 0] 37 -8.07%* -1.9414 -1.14%*** 4.0205
[-1 0] 38 -5.74% -1.3313 -0.82%** 2.2406
[0 1] 33 7.37% 1.4746 1.10% 0.9917
[0 2] 29 8.82%** 2.2932 2.13%** 2.3461
Panel D: Forced Departure of High-Quality CEOs
[-2 0] 20 -0.45% -0.5900 0.41% 1.1573
[-1 0] 21 -0.15% -0.1646 0.26% 0.3302
[0 1] 18 -1.23%* -1.7790 -0.53% 1.5025
[0 2] 17 -0.27% -0.9792 -0.71% 1.0651
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Table 13: Cross-Sectional Regressions of Operating Performance
This table shows the results of regressing OROAs adjusted with (i) the lagged OROA (LA-OROA, Regressions 1 and 2), (ii) the median
industry OROA (IA-OROA, Regressions 3 and 4), and (iii) the lagged OROA and median OROA Change (LIA-OROA, Regressions 5 and
6) on a set of explanatory variables and controls. Outside successions and forced departures are denoted by OUT and FOR, respectively.
HQY is a dummy variable that indicates a high-quality CEO. The variable assumes a value of one if the company outperformed the
market in the year preceding the turnover. SIZE denotes the logarithm of total assets, AGEDEP the age of the departing CEO and
AGEINC of the appointed CEO. DUALOLD assumes a value of one if the CEO turnover ends a dual-mandate structure and zero
otherwise. DUALNEW assumes a value of one if the CEO turnover introduces a dual-mandate structure and zero otherwise. FOR*HQY
is a dummy variable denoting forced turnovers of high-quality CEOs. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% confidence level, respectively, in a two-tailed test and t-values are depicted in parentheses.
Dependent Variable LA–OROA IA–OROA LIA–OROA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CONST 0.2117 -0.0105 0.1157 -0.0213** 0.1521 -0.0164
-0.6067 (-0.6936) (0.4767) (-2.0127) (0.425) (-1.0539)
OUT -0.007 -0.0028 -0.0104 -0.0113 -0.0113 -0.0072
(-0.3774) (-0.1578) (-0.8136) (-0.9166) (-0.5965) (-0.3963)
FOR 0.0437 0.0332 0.0271 0.0299* 0.0523* 0.0443*
(1.5828) (1.3516) (1.4151) (1.7478) (1.8451) (1.7636)
HQY 0.0317 0.0341* 0.0432*** 0.0451*** 0.0492** 0.0508**
(1.5433) (1.6971) (3.0407) (3.2376) (2.3356) (2.472)
SIZE -0.0014 0.001 -0.0012
(-0.3636) (0.3669) (-0.2951)
AGEDEP 0.0163 0.0181 0.0112
(0.2374) (0.3802) (0.1593)
AGEINC -0.0685 -0.0582 -0.0498
(-1.0554) (-1.2971) (-0.7485)
DUALOLD 0.0007 0.0003 -0.0117
(0.0234) (0.0151) (-0.3781)
DUALNEW -0.0198 0.041 -0.0239
(-0.4495) (1.4206) (-0.5293)
FOR*HQY -0.0820** -0.0783** -0.0579** -0.0676** -0.0996** -0.0948**
(-1.9861) (-1.9854) (-2.0194) (-2.4540) (-2.3524) (-2.3457)
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Figure 1: Abnormal Trading Volume
The following graphs show the standardized mean abnormal trading volume in percentage points (see Equation 1) over a 7-trading-day
window (days [-3 3]) centered around the CEO turnover announcement date (Day 0). Figure (a) refers to the total sample and Figure
(b) to voluntary and forced turnovers. The dashed lines show the standard error of the standardized mean abnormal trading volumes.
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Figure 2: Cumulative Abnormal Returns
The following graphs show the average cumulative [-3 3]-ARs around the CEO turnover announcement date (Day 0). The cumulative
ARs for the total sample are depicted in Figure (a). Figure (b) refers to the subsamples of voluntary and forced turnovers. Figure
(c) refers to the subsamples of forced turnovers of high-quality (HQY) and low-quality (LQY) managers. The grey areas indicate 5%
one-sided confidence intervals.
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(c) Forced Departures and CEO Quality
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Figure 3: Changes in Operating Performance
The following graphs show the changes in the operating return on assets (OROA) in the years surrounding the CEO turnover. Figure
(a) refers to the total sample. Figure (b) refers to the subsamples of voluntary and forced turnovers. Figure (c) refers to the subsamples
of forced turnovers of high-quality (HQY) and low-quality (LQY) CEOs.
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